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ABSTRACT 
From the patristic period to the beginning of the seventeenth century curiosity was regarded 
as an intellectual vice. Curious individuals were considered to be proud and "puffed up," 
and the objects of their investigations were deemed illicit, dispute engendering, unknow- 
able, or useless. Seventeenth-century projects for the advancement of learning had to 
distance themselves from curiosity and its dubious fruits or, alternatively, enhance the 
moral status of the curious sensibility. Francis Bacon's proposals for the instauration of 
knowledge were an integral part of a process by which curiosity underwent a remarkable 
transformation from vice to virtue over the course of the seventeenth century. The changing 
fortunes of this human propensity highlight the morally charged nature of early moder 
debates over the status of natural philosophy and the particular virtues required of its 
practitioners. The rehabilitation of curiosity was a crucial element in the objectification of 
scientific knowledge and led to a gradual shift of focus away from the moral qualities of 
investigators and the propriety of particular objects of knowledge to specific procedures 
and methods. 
Why did my parents send me to the schooles 
That I with knowledge might enrich my mind? 
Since the desire to know first made men fooles, 
And did corrupt the roote of all mankind?.... 
But we their wretched Offspring, what do we? 
Do not wee still tast of the fruite forbid? 
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Francis Bacon, Instauratio magna (London, 1620), frontispiece. The motto is from Daniel 12:4: "Multi 
pertransibunt & augebitur scientia"-"Many shall go to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased." 
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CURIOSITY AND FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE 
Whiles with fond, fruitlesse curiositie, 
In bookes prophane we seeke for knowledge hid? 
-Sir John Davies, Nosce teipsum (1599)1 
uriosity is now widely regarded, with some justification, as a vital ingredient of the 
inquiring mind and, more particularly, as a crucial virtue for the practitioner of the 
pure sciences. We have become accustomed to associate curiosity with innocence and, in 
its more mature manifestations, with the pursuit of truth for its own sake. It was not always 
so. The sentiments expressed in Sir John Davies's poem, published on the eve of the 
seventeenth century, paint a somewhat different picture. To seek knowledge with no par- 
ticular end in mind was to indulge in "fruitlesse curiositie," while the "desire to know" 
was associated with those catastrophic events that took place at the dawn of history in the 
Garden of Eden and with the ensuing curse that fell upon succeeding generations. Davies's 
poem neatly sets out two of the chief impediments to the advancement of learning in 
seventeenth-century England: the fact that the Genesis narrative attributes the Fall of the 
human race to the desire for knowledge, and the moral disapprobation associated with the 
vice of curiosity. In short, the traditional classification of curiosity amongst the vices and 
its complicity in the commission of the first sin represented a major obstacle to early 
modem projects to enlarge human learning. 
This essay will explore the changing fortunes of curiosity, from its construction as an 
intellectual vice in the patristic era to its subsequent transformation, over the course of the 
seventeenth century, to a virtue. Particular attention will be paid to the way in which 
Francis Bacon dealt with prevailing conceptions of curiosity and forbidden knowledge and 
how he modified an existing view of the moral legitimacy of knowledge of nature in order 
to provide rhetorical justification for his proposed instauration of learning. This change in 
the status of knowledge of nature, initiated by Bacon and promoted by his successors, 
highlights the morally charged character of early modem debates over the status of natural 
philosophy and the particular virtues required of its practitioners. As we shall see, the 
rehabilitation of curiosity was a crucial element in the objectification of scientific knowl- 
edge and led to a shift of focus away from the moral qualities of investigators and the 
propriety of particular objects of knowledge to specific disciplines, procedures, and meth- 
ods. 
THE HISTORY OF AN INTELLECTUAL VICE 
The Greeks had little to say directly on the issue of curiosity and forbidden knowledge, 
and while the general import of the myths of Pandora and Prometheus is clear enough, 
curiosity was not identified as a vice in the moral philosophy of the writers of classical 
antiquity. If anything, it was regarded as a natural human propensity. Aristotle, in the 
opening lines of the Metaphysics, declares that the desire for knowledge is the natural 
human condition. But he later qualifies this by stating that it is wonder (thauma), rather 
than curiosity (periergia), that is the beginning of knowledge. Amongst Roman authors, 
curiosity was the subject of mild rebuke. The specific moral category curiositas first ap- 
pears in Cicero, where it has dual aspects: on the one hand, curiosity is a necessary mo- 
' Sir John Davies, Nosce teipsum (Londson, 1599), pp. 1-2. 
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tivation for the pursuit of knowledge; on the other, it is an intemperate and excessive desire 
for unsuitable or inappiop-iate knowledge. If the natural state of the human being is to 
seek knowledge, its excess becomes the vice of curiosity. As Seneca expressed it: '"he 
desire to know more than enough is a form of intemperance."2 
In the writings of the church fathers, however, curiosity took on a somewhat more 
sinister aspect and was frequently singled out for specific censure. The chief canonical 
source for the early Christian view was the Genesis narrative of the Creation, in which 
Adam and Eve had been forbidden to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
Unfortunately for them and their issue, they succumbed. Curiosity, along with pride and 
disobedience, was thus implicated in the first sin and in the subsequent fall of the whole 
human race. Additional biblical sources reinforced the dangers of the quest for knowledge: 
"Seek not out things that are too hard for thee, neither search the things that are above thy 
strength.... Be not curious in unnecessary matters," counsels Ben Sirach. Cautions against 
overzealous inquiry are reprised in St. Paul's dismissal of "the wisdom of the world" and 
in his warnings against "philosophy and vain deceit."3 
For the Fathers, human curiosity was distinguished both by its objects and by its un- 
derlying motivations. The curious mind aimed at that knowledge that surpassed human 
capacities or that was forbidden, "worldly," or useless. As to its motivations, curiosity was 
prompted by pride, vanity, or the desire to be like God. The fourth-century theologian 
Basil the Great had asserted that "the most penetrating mind cannot attain to the knowledge 
of the least of the phenomena of the world." Given this somewhat skeptical outlook, 
attempts to discern the operations of nature were regarded as not merely futile but morally 
culpable. "Put then a limit to your thought," Basil counseled, and avoid "curiosity in 
investigating the incomprehensible." St. Jerome, translator of the Vulgate, was no less 
dismissive of the curious investigator of nature: "Is it not evident that a man who day and 
night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the 
heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Peter Chrysologus, 
fifth-century bishop of Ravenna, similarly regarded human curiosity as the pursuit of 
"worldly wisdom."4 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this understanding of cu- 
riosity would devalue the pursuit of knowledge of nature. And if such knowledge were 
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a, 982b, trans. Hugh Tredennick (London: Heinemann, 1947), pp. 3, 13. For a 
comprehensive history of wonder see Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature 
(New York: Zone, 1998); on the relation of wonder to curiosity see pp. 303-328. On curiositas see A. Labhardt, 
"Curiositas: Notes sur l'histoire d'un mot et d'une notion," Museum Helveticum, 1960, 17:206-224; and Robert 
Joly, "Curiositas," L'Antiquitd Classique, 1961, 30:33-44. For Seneca's view see Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 
88.37, trans. E. Phillips Barker, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1932), Vol. 2, p. 7,0; similar sentiments are found 
in letters 48 and 117. 
3 Genesis 3:1-7; Ecclesiasticus 3:21-23; I Corinthians 1:19-27, 2:1 f.; Colossians 2:8; and I Timothy 6:20. 
See also Ecclesiastes 1:18, 12:12; Esdras 4:23, 13:52; I Corinthians 8:1; and II Timothy 3:13-16. For typical 
patristic and medieval commentary see Ambrose, Hexameron, 1.7, 1.9, 1.24; Gregory, Moralia in lob, 27.1; 
Gregory [attr.], Dialogorum Gregorii Papae Libri Quantuor, 2, preface 1; Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistola, 190; 
Bernard, In Die Pentecostes, 3.5; and Bernard, In Solemnitate Apostolorum Petri et Pauli, 1.3. For a general 
indication of how these passages were read in early modern England, consult the relevant glosses in the Geneva 
Bible: The Bible and Holy Scriptures Conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament (Geneva, 1560). 
4 Basil, Hexaemeron, 1.9, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, 
14 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1952-1964), Vol. 8, p. 57a (cf. Job 38:6); Jerome, Commentarius in 
Epistolam ad Ephesios, 4.17, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 217 vols. 
(Paris, 1844-1905) (hereafter cited as PL), Vol. 26, p. 536 f.; and Peter Chrysologus, Collectio sermonum, 11, 
in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Vol. 24, p. 174. On the motivations see, e.g., Origen, Against Celsus, 
7.4; Tertullian, De anima, 2; Basil, Hexaemeron, 1.8-11; Peter Chrysologus, Collectio sermonum, 11; and John 
Cassian, Colationes, 14.16. 
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suspect, even more worthy of censure were the darker arts of magicians and sorcerers. 
Magic, enchantment, and divination came to be known as "the curious arts."5 
The most comprehensive analysis of curiosity amongst the Fathers was provided by 
Augustine. In a lucid passage in The Confessions, he set out the phenomenology of this 
intellectual vice. Curiosity is at work "when people study the operations of nature which 
lie beyond our grasp, when there is no advantage in knowing, and the investigators simply 
desire knowledge for its own sake." This was the besetting sin of pagan priests, philoso- 
phers, and Manichaean heretics. In various ways they had all succumbed to a "form of 
temptation," a "lust for experimenting and knowing," a "diseased craving," a "vain in- 
quisitiveness dignified with the title of knowledge and science."6 Linking the objects of 
curiosity with its base motivations, Augustine wrote of those who, forsaking virtue, "imag- 
ine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore 
the whole mass of this body which we call the world." Oracles, necromancy, and pagan 
religion in general were all associated by Augustine with curiosity. Indeed, he scarcely 
recognized a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate means of acquiring knowledge 
of nature, accusing the philosophers of a "sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the 
demons." Augustine also provided curiosity with a genealogy, placing it amongst sins of 
the first rank and linking it back to the sin of Adam and Eve. Curiosity was nothing more 
than an original concupiscence refracted through the mind rather than the body ("concu- 
piscentia oculorum," in his vivid turn of phrase-the "lust of the eyes"). As it represented 
the corruption of something more noble than the body, this species of lust was particularly 
contemptible. Most damning of all, curiosity was associated with the first and greatest of 
all sins-pride.7 
For medieval theologians curiosity, while not classified amongst the seven deadly sins, 
remained a significant vice. Vana curiositas was thus a common trope in the sermons of 
such reformers as Robert Pullen and Bernard of Clairvaux, who were active in the twelfth- 
century Ile-de-France. Bernard also addressed the topic in his more systematic theological 
writings, in which are developed the Augustinian view that curiosity is the beginning of 
pride.8 Other preachers focused their disapproval on the dubious fruits of curiosity. As- 
5 Origen, Against Celsus, 7.4; and John Cassian, Colationes, 14.16. Cf. Rabanus Maurus, Ennarationes in 
librum Numerorum (PL, Vol. 108, p. 727). 
6 Augustine, Confessions, 10.35, trans. H. Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), p. 211. For Augus- 
tine's treatment of curiosity see Hans Blumenberg, "Curiositas und Veritas: Zur Ideengeschichte von Augustin, 
Confessiones X 35," Studia Patristica, 1962, 81:294-302; Blumenberg, "Augustin's Anteil an der Geschichte 
des Begriffs der theoretischen Neugierde," Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, 1961, 7:35-70; and Lorraine 
Daston, "Curiosity in Early Modem Science," Word and Image, 1995, 11:391-404, esp. p. 393 f. 
7 Augustine, City of God, 7.34-35 ("surpassing curiosity"), in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I, ed. 
Philip Schaff, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1956) (hereafter cited as Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, I), Vol. 2, pp. 141b-142a; Augustine, Homilies on the First Epistle of John, 2.13 (association with 
oracles, etc.), ibid., Vol. 7, p. 474a; Augustine, De vera religione, 4 ("sinful curiosity"), in Opera omnia, 11 
vols. (Paris, 1836), 1/2, 121 la (cf. Augustine, Letters, 118.33, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, I, Vol. 1, p. 
450a); and Augustine, Confessions, 10.35 ("lust of the eyes"). For Augustine's views on the link with pride see 
De moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, 21; De agone Christiano, 4.4; De Trinitate, 
12.9; and City of God, 14.28. In Supra Genesi contra Manichaeos, 2.18.27, the curse placed on the serpent is 
also associated with curiosity-"to eat the earth is to look into things deep and dark": Augustine on Genesis, 
trans. Ronald Teske (Fathers of the Church, 84) (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. America Press, 1991), p. 
122. 
8 On Pullen and Bernard see Katherine Tachau, "God's Compass and 'Vana Curiositas': Scientific Study in 
the Old French 'Bible Moralisee,"' Art Bulletin, 1998, 80:7-42; and Stephen Ferruolo, The Origins of the 
Universities: The Schools of Paris and Their Critics, 1100-1215 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1985), 
pp. 231-234. For Bernard's views see Bernard of Clairvaux, "De curiositate," De modo vivendi, 54.130; and 
Bernard, "De vitanda curiositate," De interiori domo, 24.50. See also Richard Neuhauser, "The Sin of Curiosity 
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Figure 1. Old French Bible Moralis6e, Vienna ONB 2554, fol. 3v. Reproduced with the permission of 
the Bildarchiv of the Austrian National Library. The commentary on the biblical narrative reads: "That 
the pagans began the tower of Babel against God's commandment signifies the astronomers and 
dialecticians who make false proofs against the will of Jesus Christ, and He turns their work to 
nothing, and blinds them, and strikes them." Translation by Gerald Guest, in Bible Moralis6e: Codex 
Vindobonensis 2554, facsimile ed. (London: Harvey Miller, 1955), p. 57. 
trology, which at this time was beginning to attract highly placed patrons, was a popular 
target. Early in the thirteenth century Helinand of Froidmont, for example, cautioned 
against the use of astrologers, observing that their activities epitomized vain and useless 
curiosity. The beautifully illustrated thirteenth-century French Bibles Moralisees-one of 
which is the source of the famous image of the Creator measuring the earth with a com- 
pass-convey a similar message. (See cover illustration.) In these works the Tower of 
Babel, for example, comes to signify the worthlessness of pagan astronomy and logic, and 
the glosses that accompany the text and its illustrations issue ster warnings about the 
dangers of curiosity. (See Figure 1.) "The entanglement of philosophy, as secular learning, 
and astrology is a leitmotiv running through the Old French Bibles Moralisees," writes 
Katherine Tachau.9 These treatments canvass the familiar associations of curiosity with 
and the Cistercians," in Erudition at God's Service, ed. John R. Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian 
Publications, 1987), pp. 71-95. Thomas Aquinas discusses Bernard's view in Summa theologiae, 2a2ae,162.4, 
60 vols. (London: Blackfriars, 1964-1976) (subsequent references to this edition will be shown in parentheses 
by volume and page number), Vol. 44, pp. 200-209. On the medieval treatment of curiositas more generally 
see Neuhauser, 'Towards a History of Human Curiosity: A Prolegomenon to Its Medieval Phase," Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift, 1982, 56:562-578; William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in 
Medieval and Early Modem Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 59-66; G. R. Evans, 
Getting It Wrong: The Mediaeval Epistemology of Error (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 109-118; and Daston and 
Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (cit. n. 2), Ch. 3. 9 Tachau, "God's Compass," p. 15. See also Marie-Therese d'Alverny, "Astrologues et theologiens au XIIe 
siecle," in La transmission des textes philosophiques et scientifiques au Moyen Age (London: Variorum, 1994), 
p. 46. 
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pagan knowledge, astrology, and heresy but introduce some new themes as well: curiosity 
is linked with lust, with the desire for riches and renown, and (for reasons which are not 
altogether clear) with the sin of Onan. 
The stridency of these sentiments was due in part to the reintroduction into the West of 
Greek philosophy, along with its Islamic and Jewish elaborations. Negative assessments 
of curiosity thus form part of the background of the thirteenth-century prohibitions against 
the teaching of Aristotle at the University of Paris. Yet even when concessions were made 
to the value of pagan learning, curiosity retained a degree of odium as an intellectual sin. 
Thus Thomas Aquinas, while not inveighing against the investigation of nature or the 
achievements of pagan natural philosophers, still assigned curiosity to the list of vices and 
devoted a complete question to it in the Summa theologiae. Subsequently, condemnations 
of vain curiosity were to become common within Franciscan nominalism.'0 
The Renaissance and Reformation witnessed a renewed interest in curiosity-and in its 
rhetorical deployment against certain modes of knowledge. A number of factors contrib- 
uted to this phenomenon. The status of Aristotle and Aristotelianism had once again be- 
come controversial, and reformers both of religion and of learning revived the traditional 
use of this intellectual vice as a weapon against the corrupting influences of pagan phi- 
losophy. More generally, it was inevitable, given the history of curiosity, that it would 
play a significant role in those disputes about learning and the proper objects of knowledge 
characteristic of the period. In addition, Protestant reformers came to emphasize the literal 
text of Scripture in an unprecedented way. This scriptural focus meant in turn that the 
Genesis narratives of the Creation and the Fall, including the crucial episode of the tree 
of knowledge, came to occupy a central position in early modem intellectual life." "For- 
bidden fruit" was commonly associated with "forbidden knowledge," and both entailed 
the vice of curiosity. The reformer John Calvin, for example, reasserted the Aristotelian 
view that the desire for knowledge is a natural human characteristic but argued that if it 
were not controlled curiosity would be the result. Commenting on the temptation in the 
Garden of Eden, he pointed out that "the desire of knowledge is naturally inherent in man 
and happiness is supposed to be placed in it." However, "Eve erred in not regulating the 
measure of her knowledge by the will of God," and her descendants rehearse her original 
fault: "we all daily suffer under the same disease, because we desire to know more than 
is right, and more than God allows." The corruption of reason and the desire to know that 
ensued upon the Fall thus issued in "vain curiosity" that torments the mind with "super- 
fluous and useless discussions."12 
10 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a2ae. 167. Cf. Thomas Cajetan's sixteenth-century commentary, Summula 
caietana Reverendissimi domini Thome de Vio caietani cardinalis S. Sixti (Rome, 1525), s.v. "curiositas" (un- 
paginated); and Agostinus de Ancona, Summa de potestate ecclesiastica (Augsburg, 1473), fol. lr. On condem- 
nations of "vain curiosity" see Heiko Oberman, 'The Shape of Late Medieval Thought," in The Pursuit of 
Holiness in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus and Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 
1974), pp. 3-25. 
11 For typical Renaissance and Reformation treatments of curiosity see, e.g., Peter de La Primaudaye, The 
French Academie (London, 1594), Ch. 15: "Of Curiosity and Novelty"; Peter Martyr Vermnnigli, The Common 
Places of the Most Famous and Renowned Diuine Doctor Peter Martyr (London, 1583), "Of Curiosity"; and 
Thomas Wright, Passions of the Minde (London, 1604), Bk. 6, Ch. 8: "Curiosity in Knowing Things Not 
Necessary." On the scriptural focus see, e.g., Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), Ch. 6; Philip Almond, Adam and Eve in Seventeenth-Century 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999); and James Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of 
Man: Interpreting Nature in Early Modem Science and Medicine, Vol. 1 (Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 
1995). 
12 John Calvin, Commentary on Genesis, 3.5, trans. John King (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1984), p. 151; 
and Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.2.12, ed. John McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960) (hereafter cited as Calvin, Institutes), Vol. 1, p. 271. 
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With the rise of Puritanism in late sixteenth-century England, cautions against curiosity 
and overzealous scholarly endeavors appeared in a wide range of literature, representing 
a strong counterpoint to the Renaissance stress on the dignity of the human being and the 
value of learning. Sermons, emblem books, works of moral psychology, and pious med- 
itations, along with commentaries on Scripture, the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and the 
creeds, all warn against this pervasive and pernicious intellectual vice. Most writers traced 
its lineage to the Fall. A "general defect and imperfection proceeding from Nature cor- 
rupted, and tending to corruption, followeth all the Sonnes of Adam, and that is a certaine 
natural curiosity," wrote Thomas Wright in his Passions of the Minde (1604). The first 
temptation, explained the Puritan divine William Perkins, "enclosed within it many sins," 
not least of which was discontentment, for Adam and Eve became dissatisfied with their 
lot and sought to be as gods. In this intellectual restlessness lay also the seeds of curiosity: 
"The second degree of discontentment, is in the mind and inward man; and that is curios- 
itie, when a man resteth not satisfied with the measure of inward gifts received, [but] 
aspires to search out such things as God would haue kept secret."13 A fellow Puritan, the 
"silver tongued" Henry Smith, similarly admonished his congregation "not to bee curious 
in searching mysteries." It was permissible to "desire knowledge of God, as Salomon did, 
but not desire knowledge as Eue did."'4 For numerous other writers curiosity was similarly 
implicated in the commission of the first human sin.15 
While Puritan writers might have taken the lead in the condemnation of curious learning, 
it would be a mistake to conclude that they alone adopted this position. As John Morgan 
has convincingly argued, Puritans, at least in their attitude toward knowledge, were typical 
both of Protestants in general and of the dominant elements of Continental thought. Dis- 
cussions of curiosity were thus not restricted to moralists and divines, and allusions to this 
intellectual vice abound in the works of seventeenth-century poets, prose writers, and 
dramatists. Here again, curiosity is given a key role in the Fall of our first parents and is 
roundly condemned. As Aphra Behn succinctly expressed it: "Too much Curiosity lost 
paradice." On the Continent, too, similar sentiments were expressed. The French courtier 
Peter de La Primaudaye, whose influential digest of learning The French Academie ap- 
peared in English in 1594, provided a similar analysis of the way in which curiosity had 
13 Wright, Passions of the Minde (cit. n. 11), p. 312 (this author is not to be confused with the contemporary 
Catholic controversialist [d. 1624] of the same name); and William Perkins, A Discourse of the Damned Art of 
Witchcraft (Cambridge, 1608), p. 9. More broadly, see Eugene Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958). For a comprehensive account of the treatment of curiosity in this 
period see Howard Schutz, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge (New York: Modem Language Association, 1955), 
Ch. 1. Cf. Carlo Ginzberg, "High and Low: The Theme of Forbidden Knowledge in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries," Past and Present, 1976, 73:28-41. 
14 Henry Smith, The Sermons of M. Henry Smith (London, 1592), pp. 996, 997,998. It is interesting that while 
Smith particularly associates curiosity with Eve, amongst theological writers this vice is rarely gendered. Literary 
works of the seventeenth century, however, present a different perspective. In Walter Charleton's The Ephesian 
and Cimmerian Matrons (London, 1668), we encounter the sentiment that women "naturally are so much given 
to Curiosity, that some Divines have held, our Grandmother Eve had never longed for the forbidden fruit, had 
it not been forbidden" (p. 96). Aphra Behn writes that "naturally ... Maids are curious and vain": The History 
of the Nun (London, 1689), p. 58. Curiosity was presented as being natural to women, their "favourite vice." 
For additional examples see Peter Motteux, Love's a Jest (London, 1696), act 3, scene 1; Charles Gildon, The 
Post-boy Rob'd of His Mail (London, 1692), p. 208; John Milton, Samson Agonistes (London, 1671), 11. 775- 
778; and John Crown, Sir Courtly Nice (London, 1685), act 5, scene 1. 
15 See, e.g., Walter Raleigh, Historie of the World (London, 1614), p. 142; Robert Burton, The Anatomy of 
Melancholy, 1.1.1.1, ed. Thomas Faulkner et al., 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), Vol. 1, p. 122; Andrew 
Willet, Hexapla in Genesin (Cambridge, 1605), p. 58; Henry Holland, The Historie of Adam (London, 1606), p. 
10; and Edward Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinitie (London, 1654), p. 382. See also Almond, Adam and Eve 
(cit.n. 1), p. 194 f. 
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evolved from an originally pure appetite for what was good. Man, he wrote, had imprinted 
in his soul "an affected and earnest inclination to his soveraigne good" that "is drawn as 
it were by force to search it out in euery thing." However, "ignorance of things and the 
imperfection of reason, which abounde in him, bicause of his corruption, make him for 
the most part to labour and take delight in evil." Thus have men "abandoned the simplicitie 
and first modesty of their nature, to feed their minds with a vaine curiositie."16 
Most commonly, the curious quest for knowledge, as in the Augustinian analysis, was 
associated with the greatest of the deadly sins-pride. The mortal sin of pride was a master 
vice that encompassed within its scope a range of lesser vices. John Downame described 
an endless cycle of pride and curiosity: "We must labour to mortifie our spirituall pride, 
which is the mother and nurse of this idle curiosity." Curiosity, for its part, prompted the 
accumulation of vain knowledge that made its possessor proud: "it puffeth them vp with 
pride, and maketh them in the overweening conceit of their owne excellencies to contemne 
all others."17 
The expression "puffed up" was to become a commonplace in early moder discussions 
of proud knowledge. It is most familiar from Bacon's famous reference and has its origins 
in St. Paul's observation: "Scientia inflat caritas vero aedificat [Knowledge puffeth up, but 
charity edifieth]." John Calvin, endorsing Augustine's view that pride was the cause of 
the Fall, wrote that "Adam was denied the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ... to 
prevent him from becoming puffed up with wicked lust." Another citizen of Geneva, the 
Calvinist writer Lambert Daneau, spoke in his popular Wonderfvll Woorkmanship of the 
World (1578) of "the swellying and puffed Artes of Naturall Philosophie," further sug- 
gesting that heathen natural philosophers had been motivated by "a moste stronge poison 
of humane ambition." The great preacher Thomas Adams, the prose Shakespeare of Puritan 
preachers, spoke of "proud and puffed up" ignorance, which arises when "a man should 
be persuaded that hee knowes that soundly whereof he is ignorant." All the learning of 
the philosophers, Adams claimed, served merely to puff them up with pride. Pierre Char- 
ron, the French skeptical writer whose Of Wisdome was a popular moral treatise in sev- 
enteenth-century England, also claimed that knowledge might serve merely to exacerbate 
our natural prejudices and stubbornness: learning "puffeth up" and "bringeth with it pre- 
sumption and temeritie."18 (See Figure 2.) 
16 John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards Reason, Learning, and Education, 1560-1640 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), p. 43; Aphra Behn, The Luckey Chance (London, 1687), act 3, 
scene 1; and La Primaudaye, French Academie (cit. n. 11), pp. 159-161. For typical treatments in English 
literary works see Edmund Elviden, "Of Superfluous Curiosity," in The Closet of Counsells (London, 1569); 
William Averell, A Dyall for Dainty Darlings (London, 1584), p. 13; John Davies, "Sinfull Curiosity," in The 
Muses Sacrifice (London, 1612), p. 163; Thomas Heywood, The Hierarchie of the Blessed Angells (London, 
1635), Bks. 6, 7; Robert Aylett, Divine and Moral Speculations (London, 1654), Bk. 3, Meditations 1 and 2; 
Nicholas Billingsley, "On Curiosity," in A Treasury of Divine Raptures (London, 1667); and John Collop, "A 
Defence of Curiosity," in Poesis Rediviva (London, 1656). 
17 John Downame, Second Part of the Christian Warfare (London, 1611), p. 99 f. By way of contrast, Bernard 
of Clairvaux had thought that Satan fell through curiosity, which was the first step toward pride: "Curiosity 
therefore rightly claims first place among the degrees of pride, and is thus revealed as the beginning of all sin." 
Bernard of Clairvaux, De gradibus humilitatis, 3.10, 10.28, The Twelve Degrees of Humility and Pride, trans. 
B. Mills (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 70. 
18 I Corinthians 8.1 (Vulgate/Authorized Version); Calvin, Institutes, 2.1.4 (Vol. 1, p. 245) (cf. 2.7.6 [Vol. 1, 
p. 355], 2.8.1 [Vol. 1, p. 368], 3.2.22 [Vol. 1, p. 568], 4.10.12 [Vol. 2, p. 1190]); Lambert Daneau, The Wonderfvll 
Woorkmanship of the World (London, 1578), sig. 13v; Thomas Adams, The Divells Banket Described in Sixe 
Sermons (London, 1613), pp. 177-182; and Pierre Charron, Of Wisdome (London, 1604), preface. At least some 
of these categories were taught by the Schools. The scholastics, however, were less inclined to regard involuntary 
ignorance as culpable. Aquinas, for example, has quite a different conception of invincible ignorance (ignorantia 
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Figure 2. Emblem from Geffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblemes (Leiden, 1586), p. 78. The emblem 
depicts a fowler who, in concentrating his aim on the heavens, fails to see the poisonous serpent in 
the grass that brings about his downfall. The accompanying verse reads: "Let Mortall men, that are 
but earthe, and duste, Not look to highe, with puffe of worldly pride." 
The obvious consequence of these widespread condemnations of curiosity and pride 
was that the acquisition of knowledge was not, as we have become accustomed to imagine, 
a morally neutral activity. At the turn of the seventeenth century, assessments of the relative 
merits of methods of inquiry were expressed in terms of these ethical and theological 
considerations. The particular virtues required of the earnest natural philosopher were thus 
an important feature of evaluations of rival proposals for natural knowledge, and a variety 
of vices could be attributed to proponents of competing viewpoints: curious, proud and 
puffed up, vain, ambitious. For this reason, the argumentum ad hominem was considered 
a legitimate tool in early moder controversies about knowledge claims. Closely associated 
with this ethical dimension was an exegetical concern. To advance the cause of any branch 
of learning it became necessary to show how it was not merely a rehearsal of the first sin 
of Adam and Eve recorded in Genesis, how it escaped the condemnation of the wisdom 
literature according to which all human knowledge was mere "vanity," and why it was not 
invincibilis): 'This type of ignorance is called invincible because it cannot be overcome ven with effort. Since 
such ignorance cannot be conquered by human means it is neither voluntary nor sinful." Aquinas, Summa 
theologiae, la2ae.76.3 (Vol. 25, p. 149). Aquinas also speaks of affected ignorance (ignorantia ffectata), which 
he applies to the Jews who willfully refused to believe in the divinity of Christ. This ignorance "aggravates 
rather than excuses a fault." Ibid, 3a.47.6'(Vol. 54, p. 71). Proud knowledge (scientia inflat) is also discussed 
by Aquinas, but he stresses that knowledge of a truth is "essentially good" and only incidentally bad. Ibid., 
2a2ae.167.1 (Vol. 44, p. 203). Cf. also Augustine: "For science, too, which has its good measure of that which 
puffs up, or is wont to puff up, is overcome by the love for eternal things which does not puff up but, as we 
know, edifies." De Trinitate, 12.14, trans. Stephen McKenna (Fathers of the Church, 45) (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic Univ. America Press, 1963), p. 363. 
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to be equated with St. Paul's worldly scientia. Finally, the moral credentials of claimants 
to knowledge were judged in part by an examination of the fruits of their labors, along 
the lines of the phrase from Matthew 7:16 adapted by Bacon: "Ye shall know them by 
their fruits." The mark of the unworthy investigator was knowledge that was worldly, 
illicit, or useless. 
WORLDLY WISDOM, FORBIDDEN SCIENCE, AND VAIN KNOWLEDGE 
For the most part, early modem writers followed the lead of the church fathers when 
identifying the tainted fruits of curiosity. The curious inquirer aspired to those things that 
lay beyond the natural powers of the human intellect or to knowledge that was without 
profit, useless, or-in a word-"vain." Poet and peer Fulke Greville, in his influential 
Treatie of Humane Learning, referred to knowledge that "doth it self farre more ex- 
tend/Than all the mind of Men can comprehend." He associated this knowledge with "the 
same forbidden tree,/Which man lusts after to be made his Maker." Thomas Wright wrote 
in his work on the passions that curiosity extended to "those secrets, oracles, and mysteries, 
which farre exceed mens capacities, or are so vnprofitable, that the commoditie of men 
reape by them, will not countervaile the labor and paine spent in procuring, effecting, or 
obtayning of them." The Italian reformer and sometime Regius Professor of Divinity at 
Oxford, Peter Martyr, described curiosity in his encyclopaedic Common Places as "too 
much indeuour to knowe things forbidden, and such things as are nothing to the purpose." 
The independent divine Thomas Goodwin, who had advanced the rather extreme thesis 
that all thoughts are sins, regarded lust for knowledge as particularly loathsome, com- 
demning "that curious itch that is in men ... which is much delighted with new things, 
though they conceme us not."19 
The most general label for such knowledge was "worldly wisdom." St. Paul warned the 
Christians at Corinth that God had "made foolish the wisdom of this world." This text 
provided the basis for the common pairing of curiosity with "worldly wisdom." A typical 
instance is provided by La Primaudaye, who condemned that "Sophisticall curiositie and 
worldlie wisdome which are meere foolishnes before God." In its most innocuous form, 
worldly learning had the potential to seduce the curious mind away from the knowledge 
of God. "Curious speculation of creautures," thought Thomas Jackson, serves to "divert 
many minds from the invisible creator vnto whom the sight of these by nature not mis- 
leveled by inordinate or unvildy appetites would direct all." The end result of this tendency 
was that the learned might even be persuaded that God did not exist. This association of 
natural philosophy with atheism was as old as the ancient accusations leveled against 
Socrates. La Primaudaye spoke of those "curious Inquisitors of the causes of all natural 
things, that through frivolous and vnprofitable questions ... haue fallen into that impietie, 
as to seeke for another beginning of all things, than God."20 The naturalistic hypothesis 
for the world's origins was associated with Epicurus. 
An attendant danger of worldly learning, potentially more deadly even than its incipient 
19 Fulke Greville, A Treatie of Humane Learning, in Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes (London, 1633) 
(hereafter cited in parentheses as Workes), p. 23; Wright, Passions of the Minde (cit. n. 11), p. 314 (cf. Willet, 
Hexapla in Genesin [cit. n. 15], sig. A2r); Peter Martyr, Common Places (cit. n. 11), p. 332; and Thomas 
Goodwin, The Vanity of Thovghts Discovered: Together with Their Danger and Cvre (London, 1637), p. 67. 20 I Corinthians 1:20; La Primaudaye, French Academie (cit. n. 11), pp. 170 ("Sophisticall curiositie"), 161 
("curious Inquisitors"); and Thomas Jackson, A Treatise of Unbelief (London, 1625), p. 45. For the accusations 
against Socrates see Plato, Apology, 26d. 
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atheism, lay in its potential to promote error and heresy. Early modem writers reiterated 
the view of the third-century church father Tertullian, who had asserted that "Restless 
curiosity" and "philosophy," in fatal combination, were the parents of heresy. John Calvin, 
for example, continually warned the curious against examining too closely his doctrine of 
election. To do so was to seek knowledge of the inscrutable divine will, with the attendant 
danger of developing false ideas of the Deity. The conservative controversialist Alexander 
Ross reiterated Calvin's stance, stating that the real danger of curiosity was that it would 
lead to prying "into the secrets of heaven." "Worldly learning," agreed the Puritan divine 
John Downame, "is the mother of all dangerous errours and damnable heresies."21 
But where exactly were the boundaries of worldly learning supposed to lie? The illicit 
sciences of divination, magic, and witchcraft-"forbidden knowledge by forbidden 
means," to use John Milton's phrase-selected themselves. Lambert Daneau wrote in his 
Dialogue of Witches (1575) of those who, "borne away with fonde vanitie of a proude 
mynde, whyle they are not able to containe themselues within the compas of mans vnder- 
standing & capacitie, do yeelde themselves vassals to Satan, being desierous to know things 
to come & to foretell them to other [sic]." Curiosity beyond its proper bounds might thus 
lead one determined to arrive at that knowledge that could not be had by ordinary means 
to a Faustian compact with the devil. Once again, the paradigm was Eve, who had been 
persuaded by Satan to an attempted mastery of forbidden knowledge. In his Daemonologie 
(1597) James I described the process through which curiosity would eventually lead to the 
darker arts of magic. Certain learned men, he wrote, "mounting from degree to degree, 
vpon the slippery slope and vncertain scale of curiositie," are "at last entised, that where 
lawful artes or sciences fails, to satisifie their restlesse mindes, even to seeke to that black 
and vnlawful science of Magick." In this manner they re-enact that original sin of Adam, 
who by seeking to increase his knowledge extended what he knew only to what was evil: 
"and their knowledge, for all that they presume thereof, is nothing increased, except in 
knowing evil ... as Adam's was by eating of the forbidden tree." Reginald Scot, in his 
classic work on the black arts, The Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584), condemned "the 
curiositie of figure casters, the vanitie of dreamers." The charge was repeated by William 
Perkins, who asserted that curiosity leads to "the cursed art of Magick and witchcraft, as 
a way to get further knowledge in matters secret and not reueiled." Curiosity, according 
to Anthony Burgesse, was the author of "those Magick Arts and Witchcraft, which have 
abounded in the world; as also in Judicial Astrology, and such deceitful impostures."22 
21 Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, 7, 14, and Tertullian, De anima, 2, in Anti-Nicene Fathers, ed. 
Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 10 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1989), Vol. 3, pp. 246- 
247, 249-250, 182-183; Calvin, Institutes, 2.1.10 (Vol. 1, p. 254), 3.21.1 (Vol. 2, pp. 920, 920 F.) (cf. Daneau, 
Wonderfvll Woorkmanship [cit. n. 18], sig. Aiiir); Alexander Ross, Mel Heliconium (London, 1642), p. 2; and 
Downame, Second Part of the Christian Warfare (cit. n. 17), p. 100. For similar themes in contemporary poetry 
see Thomas Nash, Summers Last Will and Testament (London, 1600), 11. 1399-1410; Heywood, Hierarchie of 
the Blessed Angells (cit. n. 16), Bk. 6, 11. 6182-6199, Bk. 7, 11. 9300-9305 (pp. 333, 443); Charles Fitz-Geffry, 
The Blessed Birth-Day (London, 1636), 11. 945-954 (p. 37); Robert Aylett, "Of Truth," 11. 163-171, in Divine 
and Moral Speculations (cit. n. 16), Bk. 2, Meditation 2; Billingsley, "On Curiosity" (cit. n. 16), p. 225 f.; and 
Francis Quarles, "lob Militant," in Divine Poems (London, 1632), 11. 103-140 (p. 238 f.). It is interesting that 
even Hobbes, who gives a comparatively positive account of curiosity, implicates it in the origins of heresy. See 
Thomas Hobbes, An Historical Narration Concerning Heresy, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of 
Malmesbury, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 7 vols. (London, 1839-1845) (hereafter cited in parentheses as Works, 
with volume and page numbers), Vol. 4, p. 390; and Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.11 (ibid, Vol. 3, p. 92 f.). 
22 John Milton, Paradise Lost, Bk. 12, 1. 279; Lambert Daneau, A Dialogue of Witches (London, 1575), sigs. 
E2v-E3r; James I, Daemonologie (Edinburgh, 1597), pp. 10, 11; Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft 
(London, 1584), title page; Perkins, Discourse of the Damned Art of Witchcraft (cit. n. 13), p. 11; and Anthony 
Burgesse, The Doctrine of Original Sin Asserted (London, 1658), p. 213. For the connection between curiosity 
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Figure 3. "On Astrologers." Emblem of Icarus from Geffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblemes (Leiden, 
1586), p. 28. The accompanying verse reads: "Let suche beware, which paste theire reache doe 
mounte,/Whoe seeke the thinges, to mortall men deny'de,/And searche the Heauens, and all the 
starres accoumpte,/And tell therebie, what after shall betyde:/lWith blusshinge nowe, theire 
weaknesse righlie Weye/Least as they clime, they fall to theire decaye." 
To the catalogue of the curious arts might also be added judicial astrology and alchemy. 
In his Admonicion against Astrology Ivdiciall and Other Curiosities, translated into En- 
glish in 1561, Calvin had preached that astrology and soothsaying are the fruit of "a 
curiositie not onelye superfluous and unprofitable, but also evill & wicked." Sixteenth- 
century emblem books, which set out images with an accompanying moral text, also 
warned against the dangers of astrology. The emblem of Icarus in Geffrey Whitney's 
Choice of Emblemes (1586) bears the title "On Astrologers" and sounds the warning: "Let 
suche beware, which paste their reache doe mounte,/Whoe seeke the thinges, to mortall 
men deny'de."23 (See Figure 3.) This message was not lost on James I, who censured 
Cardanus, Cornelius Agrippa, and "diuerse others" for having "more curiously than prof- 
itably written at large." Astrology and alchemy were similarly held up by Thomas Wright 
and the occult sciences in France see M. Verbeeck, "Magie et curiosit6 au XVIIe siecle," Revue d'Histoire 
Ecclesiastique, 1998, 83:349-368; and Verbeeck, "Le p6ch6 de curiosit6 au XVIIe siecle" (m6moire de licence 
en histoire, Univ. Liege, 1984-1985). 23 John Calvin, An Admonicion against Astrology Ivdiciall and Other Curiosities, trans. G. Gylby (London, 
1561), unpaginated; and Geffrey Whitney, A Choice of Emblemes (Leiden, 1586), p. 28. See also George Wither, 
A Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and Modere (London, 1635), p. 147; and John Hall, Emblems with Elegant 
Figures (London, 1658), p. 29. The emblems of Whitney and Wither are derivatives of the Latin emblems of 
Andreas Alciatus, Andreae Alciati Emblematum Fontes Quatuor (Augsburg, 1531), numerous editions of which 
appeared between 1531 and 1621. For the Latin original see Andreas Alciatus, ed. Peter M. Daly with Virginia 
Callahan, 2 vols. (Toronto: Univ. Toronto Press, 1985), Vol. 1, p. 104. 
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as examples of the dubious fruits of curiosity. Even such apparently harmless pursuits as 
mathematics and the mechanical arts were frequently associated throughout the Renais- 
sance with the proscribed practices of witchcraft and magic. Again it was Calvin who 
complained that mathematics was often a refuge for astrologers seeking a cloak of re- 
spectability for their nefarious activities. Cornelius Agrippa readily conceded that mathe- 
matics is "necessary to" and has "an affinity with Magick."24 
Not only the occult sciences were censured as "worldly," however. A more controversial 
inclusion was the natural philosophy of Aristotle and the learning of the schools. "Worldly 
learning," for a number of seventeenth-century thinkers, thus retained some of its original 
Pauline sense, being frequently identified with Greek natural philosophy. La Primaudaye 
accused Aristotle of having burned with an inappropriate "desire of curiosity in vnder- 
standing the causes of natural things." Pliny was condemned on the same grounds. The 
interest of the seventeenth century in Aristotle, it need hardly be said, was not purely 
antiquarian. Criticism of Aristotle was aimed at his medieval and early moder adherents. 
"The Vanitie of the mind," wrote Thomas Goodwin, "appears in curiosity a longing and 
itching to be fed with, and to know (and then delighting to think of) things that do not at 
all concern us." To follow this course is to glory in one's own imagination, "as many of 
the Schoole-men did in some of their speculations, spending their pretious wits in framing 
curious webs out of their owne bowels." The primary feature of such vain knowledge was, 
for Goodwin, its "unprofitableness."25 Fulke Greville likewise described the "Vainenesse 
and Defect of Schooles." Such critical views persisted well into the seventeenth century/ 
Vain curiosity, wrote Anthony Burgesse in his 1658 work on original sin, had "filled the 
Church once with so many Schoolmen and their Questions as Aegypt was once filled with 
Caterpillars." Robert Fludd, who had himself flirted with forbidden sciences, condemned 
"the Philosophy of the Ethnicks" as "false and erroneous," "vain," and "founded upon the 
wisdom of the world." It had its ultimate source in "the Prince of darknesse." True phi- 
losophy lies "buried in darkness, through the mysty and ambiguous clouds of that cavilling, 
brabling, heathenish Philosophy, which they [the scholastics] so adore and follow, with 
their Master Aristotle, as if he were another Jesus rained down from heaven, to open unto 
mankind the treasures of the true wisdome."26 
To condemn curiosity and assert the vanity of worldly learning, however, was not nec- 
essarily to interdict all investigative endeavors. Admittedly, there were those, like Mon- 
taigne, who were content to rest in a skeptically motivated fideism. Yet many of those 
who mouthed the rhetoric of curiosity and asserted the vanity of worldly learning did not 
24 James I, Daemonologie (cit. n. 22), p. 11; Wright, Passions of the Minde (cit. n. 11), p. 315; Calvin, 
Admonicion against Astrology; and Henry Cornelius Agrippa, Three Books of Occult Philosophy, 2.1 (London, 
1651), p. 167. On unsavory associations see, e.g., Katherine Neal, "The Rhetoric of Utility: Avoiding Occult 
Associations for Mathematics through Profitability and Pleasure," History of Science, 1999, 37:151-178, esp. 
pp. 155-158; William Eamon, "Technology as Magic in the Late Middle Ages and Renaissance," Janus, 1983, 
70:171-212; and Peter Zetterberg, '"The Mistaking of 'the Mathematics' for Magic in Tudor and Stuart England," 
Sixteenth Century Journal, 1980, 11:83-97. 
25 La Primaudaye, French Academie (cit. n. 11), p. 162. Even Thomas Sprat, an enthusiastic apologist for 
natural philosophy, rebuked Pliny for his counterproductive curiosity: Sprat, History of the Royal Society of 
London (London, 1667), p. 90 f. Goodwin, Vanity of Thovghts (cit. n. 19), pp. 62, 64 f., 20. The image was not 
entirely original. See Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, in The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James 
Spedding, Robert Ellis, and Douglas Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longman, 1857-1874) (hereafter cited in paren- 
theses as Works, with volume and page numbers), Vol. 3, p. 285 f. Cf. Brian Vickers, ed., Francis Bacon (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 140, 596n. 
26 Greville, Treatie of Humane Learning (cit. n. 19), par. 60 (Workes, p. 34); Burgesse, Doctrine of Original 
Sin (cit. n. 22), p. 213 (cf. Augustine, Confessions, 10.25); and Robert Fludd, Mosaicall Philosophy Grounded 
upon the Essential Truth or Eternal Sapience (London, 1659), pp. 9, 28. 
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do so indiscriminately but, rather, attempted to utilize this moral discourse to discredit 
rival claims to knowledge. Lambert Daneau, for example, wished to replace Aristotelian 
natural philosophy with a "Christian" natural philosophy. Fulke Greville's apparently skep- 
tical Treatie of Humane Learning sought to condemn only proud and bookish learning. 
Genuine knowledge was to be drawn from nature, not from books, and true learning could 
take place only in the most humble of human hearts. Paracelsian and Helmontian attacks 
on the physick of the ancients were similarly mounted in order to propose what were 
thought to be efficacious alternatives. The acrimony of Fludd's invective against Aristotle 
and the Schoolmen was matched by an enthusiasm for his own blend of Renaissance 
hermeticism. Numerous authors also pointed out that if Scripture had condemned the 
curiosity of Eve, the foolishness of the Greeks, and the vanity of the worldly wise, it had 
equally praised the knowledge of Solomon and Job. Even Thomas Goodwin, who had 
condemned all human thoughts as vain, allowed that the study of the natural world could 
convey something of the divine nature.27 
The strategic use of the moral argument against worldly learning, however, placed an 
onus on those who proposed something in its place to show how their suggested alternative 
was itself immune to the criticism leveled against opponents: not proud or puffed up, not 
extending to what was illicit or impossible to know, not scholastic, not diabolical or mag- 
ical, not bookish, not pagan, and, crucially, not vain or useless. Attentive to the dual aspects 
of the vice of curiosity-the moral status of the inquirer and the nature of the proposed 
knowledge-proposals for the advancement of learning had to address themselves to two 
related issues, one pertaining to those seeking after knowledge, the other to the kind of 
knowledge sought. On the first count, as we have already noted, the pursuit of knowledge 
could not be isolated from a moral discourse in which specific intellectual vices were 
identified as having in the past presented insurmountable barriers to legitimate science. 
The natural philosopher, in short, was required to embody certain virtues, in particular 
humility and charity. 
On the second count, the knowledge obtained had also to meet a number of criteria. 
Above all, it could not be vain or unprofitable. The familiar seventeenth-century rhetoric 
of the usefulness of natural philosophy was addressed to this concern. Neither could it be 
concerned with "forbidden" things. Hence the tendency to define the legitimacy of natural 
philosophy in terms of its distance from the illicit sciences, in particular magic and witch- 
craft, and to a lesser extent those other endeavors with occult associations-astrology, 
alchemy, Paracelsianism, hermeticism. Knowledge could not be sought that was beyond 
human capacities, whence new epistemological projects to establish the legitimate bounds 
of human knowledge. Finally, learning could not be dispute engendering. Again, this 
requirement called for epistemological endeavors, along with the establishment of specific 
practices and procedures designed to make explicit the criteria for making and contesting 
knowledge claims.28 The most comprehensive seventeenth-century response to these con- 
cerns was provided by Francis Bacon's program for the instauration of natural philosophy. 
27 Daneau, Wonderfvll Woorkmanship (cit. n. 18), sig. lOr (cf. sig 3r and translator's introduction); Greville, 
Treatie of Humane Learning, pars. 62, 75, 150 (Workes, pp. 35, 37, 51); Smith, Sermons (cit. n. 14), p. 997; 
Bacon, Advancement of Learning (cit. n. 25) (Works, Vol. 3, p. 298 f.); and Goodwin, Vanity of Thovghts (cit. 
n. 19), p. 64. 
28 Steven Shapin's Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago: 
Univ. Chicago Press, 1994), focuses on the role of trust in seventeenth-century English natural philosophy and 
thus addresses similar concerns from a different perspective. Shapin suggests that the natural philosopher had 
to exemplify certain virtues and that strategies for determining the veracity of knowledge claims were adjudicated 
by a gentlemanly community in such a way as to avoid fruitless disputation. 
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BACON'S INSTAURATION AND FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE 
Any project that advocated the expansion of knowledge would need to address the moral 
and theological discourse that centered on the themes of curiosity, vain knowledge, and 
pride. It would need also to confront the Genesis account of the Creation and the temptation 
of Adam and Eve, which on a literal reading implied that the quest for certain kinds of 
knowledge had resulted in the Fall of the human race. Francis Bacon engaged in a masterful 
manipulation of contemporary moral and theological concerns about knowledge to put his 
case for the advancement of learning. 
In two paragraphs in Valerius Terminus (ca. 1603), an unpublished precursor to The 
Advancement of Learning, Bacon addressed virtually all of the criticisms of learning em- 
bedded in the contemporary conception of curiosity: 
So as whatsoever is not God but parcel of the world, he hath fitted it for the comprehension of 
man's mind, if man will open and dilate the powers of understanding as he may. But yet 
evermore it must be remembered that the least part of the knowledge passed to man by this so 
large a charter from God must be subject to that use for which God hath granted it; which is 
the benefit and relief of the state and society of man; for other wise all manner of knowledge 
becometh malign and serpentine, and therefore as carrying the quality of the serpent's ting 
and malice it maketh the mind of man to swell; as the Scripture saith excellently, knowledge 
bloweth up, but charity buildeth up. 
For Bacon, knowledge of the world is neither forbidden nor exceeds our capacities, for 
God has fitted the world to human capabilities. The legitimacy of such knowledge is 
evident from its usefulness-"the benefit and relief of the state and society of man." The 
quest for this beneficial knowledge, moreover, is nothing other than the practice of the 
greatest of the theological virtues, charity. There is, Bacon concedes, a forbidden, serpen- 
tine, knowledge, that to which our first parents aspired and that produces the greatest of 
the seven deadly sins-pride. But it is the usefulness of knowledge that is the chief sign 
of its charitable, rather than proud, nature. Bacon concludes this section by providing 
instances of the latter. Legitimate knowledge of nature is not the fruit of "the pleasure of 
curiosity": this dubious distinction is reserved for "all the vain and abusing promises of 
Alchemists and Magicians, and such like light, idle, ignorant, credulous, and fantastical 
wits and sects."29 
These same themes were developed further in The Advancement of Learning (1605). 
Here Bacon reiterates his conviction that knowledge of the world is not beyond human 
capacities because "God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the 
image of the universal world." Bacon confronts the na'ative of Genesis even more directly 
in this context, contesting the common reading of the account of the temptation according 
to which "the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin where- 
upon ensued the fall of man." He concedes the power of knowledge to corrupt the knower. 
If knowledge is sought "without the true corrective thereof, [it] hath in it some venom or 
malignity." Such knowledge is "proud knowledge" or knowledge that "hath in it something 
of the serpent."30 Again, Bacon turns the biblical phrase "Scientia inflat caritas vero ae- 
29 Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus (Works, Vol. 3, pp. 221, 222, 223). For an account of the religious 
elements in Valerius Terminus see Benjamin Milner, "Francis Bacon: The Theological Foundations of Valerius 
Terminus," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1997, 58:245-264. 
30 Bacon, Advancement of Learning (cit. n. 25) (Works, Vol. 3, pp. 265, 264); and Francis Bacon, De augmentis, 
7.8 (Works, Vol. 5, p. 29). Compare the defense in Daneau, Wonderfvll Woorkmanship (cit. n. 18), sig. 3v. 
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dificat" to his own purposes. The necessary corrective to "proud knowledge," he asserts, 
is the moral virtue of Christian love (caritas): "This corrective spice, the mixture whereof 
maketh knowledge so sovereign, is charity." Charity thus contrasts with a range of im- 
proper motives for the acquisition of knowledge: "natural curiosity and appetite," "repu- 
tation," "victory of wit and contradiction," "lucre and profession." Charity aims instead at 
the sole legitimate end of learning: "the glory of the creator and the relief of man's estate." 
Finally, as pride subsumes all the vices, so does its contrary, charity, include within its 
scope all the virtues: Charity is "the bond of perfection, because it comprehendeth and 
fasteneth all the virtues together."31 
In the preface to The Great Instauration (1620), the themes appear yet again. Knowledge 
must be "discharged of that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the 
mind of man to swell." This will enable sober minds to "cultivate the truth in charity." In 
the concluding remarks of the preface Bacon asks of his readers "that they consider what 
are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, 
or for contention or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of 
these inferior things; but for the benefit and use of life; and that they perfect and govern 
it in charity." Again, in one of the best-known passages in all of his works, Bacon speaks 
of repairing the losses that ensued upon the Fall. Nature "is now by various labours (not 
certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labours) at length and 
in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread; that is, to the uses of human 
life." Both in the negative parenthetical qualification-not through disputation, not through 
magic-and in the positive assertion of the usefulness of the endeavor, Bacon addresses 
the discourse of curiosity.32 
While some have doubted the sincerity of Bacon's moral and theological rhetoric, it is 
clear that the virtue of charity so lauded in these passages was central to an underlying 
conviction that informs not merely Bacon's rhetoric about knowledge but the whole range 
of his activities. Thus, for example, in a letter explaining his reasons for seeking a position 
at court, Bacon insists that it is not "curiosity, or vain glory," but "philanthropia" that 
motivates him. The centrality of philanthropia and charity recurs as a theme in the 1612 
volume of Essays in a piece entitled "Of Goodness and Goodness in Nature," and indeed 
"philanthopy" is a term that Bacon himself introduced into the English lexicon. Bacon 
designates philanthropia as the greatest "of all the virtues and dignities of the mind"; it is 
nothing less than "the character of the Deity." It is a form of goodness that is to be equated 
with "the theological virtue Charity." The motif of charity also dominates the early reli- 
31 Bacon, Advancement of Learning (Woqks, Vol. 3, pp. 294, 442). In standard scholastic accounts, charity is 
the crown of the three theological virtues-faith, hope, and love. See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a2ae.23, 
la2ae.23.8; for Aquinas, love was the form of all the virtues. As the chief of the theological virtues, charity was 
the counterpart of pride, the first of the seven deadly sins. In the original description of this supreme Christian 
virtue, St. Paul notes that charity "is not puffed up" (I Corinthians 13:4). Calvin also suggested a fundamental 
opposition between charity and pride: Institutes, Vol. 1, p. 695. The contrast Bacon draws between curiosity and 
charity as motives for knowledge appears in other contemporary writers. Thus the poet Robert Aylett: "Some 
only seek to know that they may know/And this is foolish curiosity/And some of Learning make a goodly 
show,/And this is base and idle vanity;/Some Knowledge seek for their utility,/Or their preferment, which is 
filthy gain;/Some to teach others which is Charity." "The Brides Ornament," 11. 127-133, in Divine and Moral 
Speculations (cit. n. 16), p. 145. See also John Reynolds, The Triumphs of God's Revenge (London, 1635), p. 
11 f.; and Collop, "Defence of Curiosity" (cit. n. 16), 11. 80-84. 
32 Francis Bacon, The Great Instauration, preface (Works, Vol. 4, p. 20 f.); and Bacon, Novum Organum, 2.52 
(Works, Vol. 4, pp. 247-248). On Bacon's explicit distancing of his project from magic and hermeticism see 
Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), esp. pp. 22- 
35. 
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gious work Meditationes. Here Bacon emphasizes the necessity for good works to accom- 
pany faith. Jesus is the best model, "for all his miracles were for the benefit of the human 
body, his doctrine for the benefit of the human soul." These two facets of usefulness- 
physical and spiritual-reappear during the Interregnum in justifications of medical re- 
forms and are later repeated by Joseph Glanvill and Robert Boyle in their defenses of the 
usefulness of the experimental philosophy.33 
Bacon's achievement in sanctifying the pursuit of natural philosophy was twofold. First, 
he countered the most common biblical objections to the promotion of learning by pro- 
viding a rereading of the narrative of the temptation in the Garden. Applying the Protestant 
exegetical principle that Scripture must interpret Scripture, he brought the Pauline "Scientia 
inflat" to bear on the text of Genesis, yielding an interpretation that was to legitimate 
natural philosophy. Additional support for such a reading was supplied from the text of 
Daniel 12:4, "Many shall go to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased," which for 
Bacon implied that "in the last stages of the world" voyages of discovery and the advance- 
ment of the sciences were destined by providence to meet in the same age.34 (See Fron- 
tispiece.) This added an eschatological element to the moral perspective. The significance 
of the liberating effect of these readings was not lost on subsequent thinkers. These two 
biblical justifications for natural philosophy gave a particular resilience to the Baconian 
program during a period when appeals to biblical authority were decisive. If the incipient 
millenarianism of his reading of the passage from Daniel and his rhetoric of restoring 
human dominion over the earth provided inspiration for the various chiliastic movements 
associated with new scientific and technological projects during the Interregnum, the more 
staid moral component, with its emphasis on the control exercised by charity, ensured its 
tenure through the Restoration, when more enthusiastic eschatological enterprises were 
viewed with some suspicion. 
The second aspect of Bacon's achievement was his response to the related issue of the 
moral legitimacy of the quest for knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge need not be morally 
improper if it is carried out with the correct motivations and gives rise to knowledge that 
is useful. The vocation of natural philosophy, in short, demands certain moral qualifica- 
tions. The mind must be purged of improper motives, and the tendency to excess, the rule 
of the passions, and the triumph of intellectual lust, all of which were both cause and 
consequence of the Fall, reined in. This insistence upon mental discipline is reminiscent 
of medieval meditative and ascetic traditions that require the mind to be purged and purified 
before it attains knowledge. Aquinas had explained how lust and gluttony give rise to 
"blindness of mind," whereas abstinence and chastity "dispose man very much to the 
perfection of intellectual operation." Later ascetic writers took a similar view. "Were you 
inwardly good and pure, you would see and understand all things clearly and without 
difficulty," wrote Thomas a Kempis. The extreme tendency of this view is present in the 
seventeenth century in the influential writings of Jacob Boehme, who claimed that human 
knowledge could be opened up not by "Academick, or University, or Scholastick learning: 
33 The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, 7 vols. (London, 1861-1874), Vol. 1, p. 
109; Francis Bacon, Essays (Works, Vol. 6, p. 403); and Bacon, Meditationes sacrae (Works, Vol. 7, p. 244). 
On Bacon's philanthropy see Brian Vickers, "Bacon's So-called 'Utilitarianism': Sources and Influences," in 
Francis Bacon: Terminologia efortuna nel XVII secolo, ed. Marta Fattori (Rome: Ateneo, 1984), pp. 281-314; 
and Masao Watanabe, "Francis Bacon: Philanthropy and the Instauration of Learning," Annals of Science, 1992, 
49:163-173. For the Interregnum see, e.g., John Webster, Academiarum examen (London, 1654); and H. Pinnel, 
Philosophy Reformed and Improved in Four Profound Tractates (London, 1657). See also Charles Webster, The 
Great Instauration: Science, Medicine, and Reform, 1626-1660 (London: Duckworth, 1975), pp. 282-288. 34 Bacon, Novum Organum (Works, Vol. 4, p. 91). 
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but by earnest repentance, fasting, watching, praying, knocking, and seeking in the suf- 
ferings of Iesus Christ by the Holy Ghost." Bacon himself, while decrying such extremes, 
frequently observed that the mind in pursuit of knowledge needs to be "purifed and purged 
of fancies and vanity." Charity is the principle that must "govern" the quest for knowledge; 
it is a virtue of "which there can be no excess."35 In short, it is charity that must motivate 
the knower, not curiosity.36 
The Baconian defense of the moral appropriateness of seeking knowledge of nature 
provided legitimation for the scientific projects of the Commonwealth and, subsequently, 
those of the Royal Society. If the positive eschatological images provided by Bacon served 
to inspire the many and varied projects for the advancement of knowledge and relief of 
man's estate during the Commonwealth period as Charles Webster has suggested, we must 
add that in addition to providing positive incentives, Bacon had neutrali7ed standard as- 
sumptions about curiosity and forbidden knowledge that might have impeded such proj- 
ects. Neither were Restoration advocates of the new philosophy unaware of their enormous 
debt to Bacon's defense of natural philosophy. As the poet Abraham Cowley was to write 
in his dedicatory poem to the Royal Society: 'The Orchard's open now, and free/Bacon 
has broke that Scar-crow Deity." Thus was Bacon credited with having provided a new, 
liberating reading of the narrative of the Fall and, consequently, exorcising the notion of 
a Deity who frowned upon projects for the advancement of the sciences.37 
THE REHABILITATION OF CURIOSITY 
Bacon's strategy for dealing with the difficulties caused his proposed instauration by the 
dubious status of curiosity consisted in insulating his natural philosophy from the criticisms 
associated with that particular intellectual vice. Bacon did not deny the dangers of curiosity 
and pride but showed how a legitimate natural philosophy might avoid the more obvious 
problems and how its practitioners might be immune to the moral pitfalls traditionally 
associated with the acquisition of knowledge. It was entirely approptiate that the Fellows 
of the Royal Society consider themselves in his debt. The interval between Bacon's jus- 
tification of the sciences and the founding of the Royal Society, however, witnessed a 
parallel development that further smoothed the path for the new philosophies. From early 
in the seventeenth century lone voices had begun to question whether any moral odium 
35 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a2ae.15.3 (Vol. 32, p. 143) (cf. Gregory: "dullness of sense arises from 
gluttony and blindness of mind from lust." Moralia in lob, 31.45, in Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Vol. 
143B, pp. 1610-1611); Thomas a Kempis, The Imitation of Christ, 2.4, trans. Leo Sherley-Price (Ringwood, 
Victoria: Penguin, 1952), p. 72; Jacob Boehme, The Second Booke, Concerning the Three Principles of the 
Divine Essence (London, 1648), preface; and Bacon, Great Instauration (cit. n. 32) (Works, Vol. 4, p. 20) (cf. 
Bacon, Prayers, 1 [Works, Vol. 7, p. 259]). On the connection between control of the passions and acquisition 
of knowledge see Peter Harrison, "Reading the Passions: The Fall, the Passions, and Dominion over Nature," in 
The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (London: 
Routledge, 1998), pp. 49-78. 
36 It is also suggestive that the patristic and medieval theological sources posit an opposition between curiosity 
and charity. "They were drawn by curiosity, not by charity," wrote Augustine of the Jews who came to see 
Lazarus raised from the dead. These curious spectators thus exemplified "the strange scheming of human vanity." 
Augustine, Tractates on John, 50.14, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, I, Vol. 7, p. 283b. "Charity is not 
vanity," Aquinas was later to write; "indeed it is opposed to vanity." Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 2a2ae.23.2 
(Vol. 34, p. 15). Faith was also frequently opposed to curiosity. The latter attached to objects of the senses, and 
the eyes in particular, the former to higher unseen things. See Evans, Getting It Wrong (cit. n. 8), p. 114. 
37 Webster, Great Instauration (cit. n. 33); Cowley's poem appears in Sprat, History of the Royal Society (cit. 
n. 25), sig. Bv. 
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ought to be attached to curiosity, and by the end of the century they had become a chorus. 
Thus, over the course of the century a gradual rehabilitation of curiosity began, allowing 
for a more aggressive justification of the pursuit of natural philosophy than that which 
Bacon had found it necessary to articulate. 
Thomas Hobbes, for example, turned his back completely on the long-standing moral 
tradition in his account of curiosity. He ignored the narrative of the Fall and avoided the 
familiar associations of pride, vanity, and forbidden knowledge. Instead, curiosity was the 
morally neutral "appetite of knowledge." Indeed, more than an innocuous appetite, curi- 
osity was actually praised as the one characteristic that distinguished man from the beasts 
and as the beginning from which "is derived all philosophy." Hobbes regarded this latter 
relation as being to the credit of curiosity. In a letter to the marquis of Newcastle he went 
so far as to assert the value of pursuing knowledge for its own sake, even when no useful 
application is in sight. 
And therefore as in the cognitive faculties reason, so in the motive curiositie, are the markes 
that part ye bounds of man's nature from that of beastes. Which makes mee, when I heare a 
man, upon the discovery of any new and ingenious knowledge or invention, aske gravely, that 
is to say, scomefully, what 'tis good for, meaning what monie it will bring in, (when he knows 
as little, to one that hath sufficient what that overplus of monie is good for), to esteeme that 
man not sufficiently removed from brutalitie. Which I thought fit to say by way of anticipation 
to ye grave scomers of philosophie... .38 
In their insightful analysis of the shifting sensibilities of this period, Lorraine Daston 
and Katharine Park identify in Hobbes the beginnings of a new twofold association of 
curiosity with greed, on the one hand, and with the more respectable wonder, on the other.39 
While a new alliance with greed may seem to add little to the fortunes of curiosity, it was 
at least a step away from lust and pride, which were far worse. In this new map of the 
relationships of the sensibilities, curiosity was distanced from the vices associated with 
the Fall and thus began its liberation from the burdens imposed upon it by sacred history. 
In addition, some of the stigma associated with it was subsequently transferred to won- 
der-which, having brought respectability to curiosity, was in the eighteenth century to 
suffer a rapid decline in its own reputation. 
It is worth noting in passing that on the Continent Descartes, too, tended to disregard 
the traditional biblical associations of curiosity. For Descartes, as for Hobbes, it was cu- 
riosity, common to all men, that motivated the quest for knowledge.40 Only when curiosity 
was undisciplined and unmethodical did it become "blind" and counterproductive. The 
Cartesian project thus sought not to eliminate curiosity but to discipline and direct it. In 
the Regulae Descartes explained how it was the purpose of his rules and his method to 
38 Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, 1.9.18 (Works, Vol. 4, p. 50 f.); Hobbes, Leviathan (Works, Vol. 3, p. 44); 
Hobbes, Decameron physiologicum, Ch. 1 (Works, Vol. 7, p. 71); and Hobbes, "To the Marquis of Newcastle," 
in Letters (Works, Vol. 7, p. 467). Robert Hooke and, after him, Samuel Johnson also suggest that curiosity is 
a distinguishing feature of the human race. See Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), preface; for 
Johnson's views see Robert J. Mayhew, "Nature and the Choice of Life in Rasselas," Studies in English Liter- 
ature, 1500-1900, 1999, 39:539-552. 
39 Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (cit. n. 2), pp. 305-328. 
40 Rene Descartes, Passions of the Soul, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984-1991) (hereafter 
cited in parentheses as Philosophical Writings, with volume and page numbers), Vol. 1, p. 359; and Descartes, 
The Search for Truth, sect. 499 (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 402). Like Bacon, however, Descartes did have to address the 
issue of "puffed knowledge" and show why his own philosophical program was immune to the Pauline charge. 
See Descartes, Reply to Objections, 6 (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 290). 
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control "blind curiosity" so that the mind might be directed toward knowledge. In his 
account of the passions, he similarly insisted that only the extremes of wonder and curiosity 
will lead to error. It is "excessive wonder" and "blind curiosity" that must be controlled if 
useful knowledge is to be attained.41 This is not to say that Descartes's analysis of knowl- 
edge and the role of curiosity in erroneous judgments was completely novel. His psycho- 
logical account of the origins of error owes much to an Augustinian view of the will. 
Curiosity results from the fact that the extent of the will is greater than that of the intellect. 
As Descartes explains, "It is of the nature of a created intellect to be finite; and it is of the 
nature of a finite intellect that its scope should not extend to everything." However, the 
will suffers from fewer limitations than the intellect. Hence in the freedom of the will lies 
the possibility for error: "The fact that we fall into error is a defect in the way we act, not 
a defect in our nature. The faults of subordinates may often be attributed to their masters, 
but never to God."42 This, in essence is the same argument that we find in Augustine and, 
later, Calvin. According to Augustine's analysis, curiosity results from disordered relations 
amongst the faculties of the soul. As G. R. Evans describes it: "Will ought also to be 
subordinate to reason, but if will becomes dominant there is uncontrollable curiositas." 
The similarity of this view to that of Descartes is difficult to dismiss. Descartes, however, 
is less concerned with condemnation of this inherent tendency than with its rectification. 
He thus provides an Augustinian analysis of the will to highlight the inevitability of cu- 
riosity but at the same time supplies a prescription for reining it in-namely, the rules for 
the pursuit of natural philosophy.43 Nicolas Malebranche followed Descartes, insisting that 
curiosity is "natural and necessary," although he too warned that failure to control it will 
inevitably lead to "many errors." These analyses thus dispensed with the connection be- 
tween curiosity and original sin, resting instead on the common neo-Stoic ideal of tem- 
perance and rational control.44 
Similar themes appear in seventeenth-century English literature. In Milton's great epic 
poem Adam's curiosity is presented as, in itself, quite harmless. Our first father was "led 
on, yet sinless, with the desire to know." Unfettered curiosity was the condition Raphael 
warned Adam against: "But knowledge is as food, and needs no less/Her Temperance over 
Appetite, to know/In measure what the mind may well contain,/Oppresses else with Surfet, 
41 Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, rule 4, sect. 371 (Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1, p. 
15); and Descartes, Passions of the Soul, sect. 386 (ibid., p. 355) (emphasis added). Cf. Descartes, Search for 
Truth, sects. 499, 500 (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 402). 42 Ren6 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, sects. 36, 38 (Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1, p. 205). Cf. Baruch 
Spinoza, Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, 1.174, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. 
Edwin Curley (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), p. 257. 
43 Evans, Getting It Wrong (cit. n. 8), p. 60. For the general thesis that Augustine's thought directly influenced 
Descartes see Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). For Des- 
cartes's view see Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, rule 4 (Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1, p. 15); 
and Descartes, Passions of the Soul (ibid., p. 355). Cf. Descartes, Searchfor Truth (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 402). Descartes 
thus ignores Augustine's understanding of curiosity based on the exegesis of Genesis and instead adopts Au- 
gustinian psychology in his account of curiosity. 44 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, 4.3, ed. and trans. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), p. 278 f. Cf. Francisco Sanches, "That Nothing Is Known," preface, 
in Descartes' Meditations: Background Source Materials, ed. Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), p. 10. Pascal set out the opposing view-that it is better to be in 
error than to be curious: "For the chief malady of man is restless curiosity about things which he cannot under- 
stand; and it is not so bad for him to be in error as to be curious to no purpose." Blaise Pascal, Pensees, 744, 
trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1966), p. 256. The Stoic position was that the moral life 
is a means of guaranteeing freedom from intellectual error. See Gerard Verbeke, "Ethics and Logic in Stoicism," 
in Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed. Margaret Osler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 11-24. 
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and soon turns/Wisdom to Folly, as Nourishment to Winde."45 Once again it is the control 
of this natural and innocent inclination that leads to appiopiiate knowledge. 
Such sentiments, not surprisingly, were also rehearsed in Restoration defenses of the 
mechanical philosophy. In The Usefulnesse of Natural Philosophy (1663) Boyle reminds 
his readers of Aristotle's assertion that the desire for knowledge is the natural human 
condition. Through the pursuit of natural philosophy, he continues, "man's curiosity for 
knowledge is much gratified." Such gratification, moreover, is not to be condemned as 
"trifling and unserviceable" but was practiced by those "of the severest virtue."46 William 
Clark, commenting on the mysteries of divine providence as set out in the book of Job, 
reinforced the divine interdict on "such things/As far exceed all humane reasonings," while 
asserting at the same time that "the wit of man, may safely pry/in things on earth, and 
with security.... For our great God not only doth allow/Such curious searchings, but 
assists him too." Edward Tyson, the physician and anatomist, openly announced in his 
1681 translation of one of Jan Swammerdam's works on insects that it was his design "to 
gratifie the Ingenious and Curious." Those who derided curiosity and devalued such works 
were simply "Ignorant."47 
Tyson's sensitivity on this point illustrates the fact that the charge of curiosity was still 
by no means an empty one. Joseph Glanvill, a Fellow of the Royal Society and a leading 
apologist for the new natural philosophy, thus spoke with exasperation of those who "set 
up a loud cry against Reason," misapplying the names of "Vain Philosophy, Carnal Rea- 
soning, and the Wisdom of this World." There was, acknowledged Glanvill, a "blameable 
curiosity in things not worth our pains, orforbidden our scrutiny," but the quest for knowl- 
edge became a "Duty, and laudable endeavour in matters that are weighty and permitted 
to our search." Investigating the subject matter of natural philosophy was one such laud- 
able activity. John Norris, in his dedicatory poem to Robert Plot's Natural History of 
Stafford-shire (1686), argued that condemnations of curiosity were now simply an excuse 
for idleness: 
What strange Perversity is this of Man! 
When 'twas a Crime to taste th' inlightning Tree 
He could not then his hand refrain, 
None then so inquisitive, so Curious as He. 
But now he has Liberty to try and know 
God's whole Plantation below; 
Now the Angelic fruit may be 
Tasted by all whose Arms can reach the Tree: 
H' is now by Licence careless made, 
The Tree neglects to climb, and sleeps beneath the Shade. 
45 Milton, Paradise Lost, Bk. 7,11. 61, 126-130. Cf. "Heav'n is for thee to high/To know what passes there; 
be lowlie wise": Bk. 8,1. 172 f. See also Patrick Brantlinger, "To See New Worlds: Curiosity in Paradise Lost," 
Modem Language Quarterly, 1972, 33:355-369. 
46 Robert Boyle, Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse of Experimental Naturall Philosophy (London, 
1663), pp. 6, 7; for Aristotle's assertion see Metaphysics, 980a. Cf. Samuel Butler: "Man has a natural Desire 
to know,/but h' one Half, is for Interest, Th'other show." "Satyr on the Imperfection and Abuse of Human 
learning," Pt. 1, U. 123-126, in Satires and Miscellaneous Poetry and Prose, ed. Ren6 Lamar (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1928), p. 71. 47 William Clark, The Grand Tryal; or, Poetical Exercitations upon the Book of Job (London, 1685), 11. 16, 
19-20, 42-43; and Jan Swammerdam, Ephemeri vita, trans. Edward Tyson (London, 1681), "To the Reader." 
Cf. John Norris, who stated that "the Almighty gets no praise from this dull kind ... such ignorance can ne're 
devotion raise": "To Dr. Plot on His Natural History of Stafford-shire," 11. 27, 29, in A Collection of Miscellanies 
(London, 1692). 
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By the end of the century John Locke, likewise, was to turn accusations of curiosity and 
vanity back on the accusers. The claim that the sciences were "idle and empty amusements, 
comparatively of no use or importance," he pointed out, was itself "the effect of ignorance 
and not knowledge, the being vainly puffed up with a flatulency arising from a weak and 
narrow comprehension."48 These responses suggest that while there were still those who 
regarded curiosity as a vice, the tide was turning against them. 
When it served their purposes, however, advocates of the new philosophy were happy 
to wield this rhetorical weapon against others. John Wilkins warned against "the disease 
of curiosity," which he seems to have associated with the useless pedantry of the schools. 
"Pedantic learning," he cautioned, may infect a man with "pride, and affectation, as will 
render him unfit for any great employment." Anthony Burgesse, in a lengthy anti-Catholic 
polemic on original sin, allowed the universality of this particular disease of the soul but 
suggested that Scholastics were more prone to it than most. "Is this not a very natural sin 
in all, a curiosity in knowledge?" he inquired. "Do not all desire to eat of the tree of 
knowledge, but few of the tree of life, especially Scholars, and such who are buried in 
learning?"49 
Neither could Boyle, for all his advocacy of the virtues of the inquiring mind, completely 
divest himself of the idea that curiosity had its darker side. He confided to Bishop Gilbert 
Burnet that on one occasion, having been invited to look into a magical glass, "he had the 
greatest Curiosity he ever felt in his life tempting him to look into it." Eventually, "he 
overcame himselfe which he accounted the greatest Victory he had ever over himself." 
For the scrupulous Boyle, the pursuit of natural philosophy called for a precarious balance 
between the extremes of skepticism and curiosity. He was acutely conscious that his special 
vocation could easily engender "anxious doubts," on the one hand, and "a disquieting 
curiosity," on the other.50 
These developments suggest a new prescription for the control of intellectual desire and 
for the acquisition of knowledge. What is now required is the cardinal virtue of temperance 
rather than the theological virtue of charity. Curiosity tends to become the natural mean, 
rather than the extreme. The universality of curiosity, once considered evidence of its 
48 Joseph Glanvill, AOFOF OPHZKEIA; or, A Seasonable Recommendation and Defence of Reason (London, 
1670), p. 2 (cf. p. 17); Glanvill, Philosophia Pia; or, A Discourse of the Religious Temper, and Tendencies of 
the Experimental Philosophy, Which Is Profest by the Royal Society (London, 1671), p. 127; Norris, "To Dr. 
Plot," 11. 1-10; and John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 22, 5th ed., ed. Thomas Fowler (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1901), p. 48. One of Glanvill's targets identified himself: Robert Ferguson, The Interest of 
Reason in Religion (London, 1675), p. 7. See Jan Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of Reason (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), pp. 65-72. 
49 John Wilkins, Sermons Preached upon Several Occasions (London, 1682), pp. 165-196, cit. in Adrian 
Johns, "Prudence and Pedantry in Early Modem Cosmology: The Trade of Al Ross," Hist. Sci., 1997, 35:23- 
59; and Burgesse, Doctrine of Original Sin (cit. n. 22), p. 184 (later Burgesse was to argue that curiosity was 
the effect rather than the cause of original sin [p. 212]). Johns's paper provides an interesting analysis of 
"pedantry," another intellectual vice the fortunes of which in some respects parallel those of "curiosity." See 
also Steven Shapin, "'A Scholar and a Gentleman': The Problematic Identity of the Scientific Practitioner in 
Early Modem England," Hist. Sci., 1991, 29:279-327. Bishop Stillingfleet, writing in 1661, claimed that curiosity 
was implicated in the chaos of the Interregnum: "Curiosity, that Greensickness of the soul, . . . hath been the 
Epidemicall distemper of the Age we live in." Edward Stillingfleet, Irenicum (London, 1661), sig. A3v. 
50 Michael Hunter, ed., Robert Boyle by Himself and His Friends (London: Pickering, 1994), p. 32 (magical 
glass); and Robert Boyle, The Excellency of Theology, in The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas 
Birch, 6 vols. (London, 1772), Vol. 4, p. 36. See also Hunter, "Alchemy, Magic, and Moralism in the Thought 
of Robert Boyle," British Journal for the History of Science, 1990, 23:387-410. Burnet himself adhered to the 
traditional view that curiosity was the parent of heresy-and, specifically, of trinitarian heresy: Gilbert Burnet, 
A Vindication of the Authority, Constitution, and Laws of the Church and State of Scotland (Glasgow, 1673), p. 
82. 
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complicity in original sin, now becomes evidence instead of its naturalness. This change 
in the fortunes of curiosity thus reflects the beginning of a more general moral shift in 
which, from the end of the seventeenth century, the ethical function of biblical narratives 
is overshadowed by the search for moral imperatives in reason and nature. The "natural- 
ness" of curiosity becomes reason to embrace it rather than to condemn it. It is also 
presumed that curiosity had some legitimate purpose or end, part of which was to seek 
out moral regularities in nature. 
Much of this change has to do with the deployment of physico-theological arguments 
that asserted the religious "usefulness" of knowledge of nature. God is to be found in the 
book of his works, where his designs tell of his wisdom and power. Boyle thus spoke of 
"curious and useful creatures" and of a book of nature adorned with a "variety of curious 
pictures." "Curious" became a way of identifying divine ingenuity, the discovery of which 
required the cultivation of a corresponding virtue on the part of human investigators. "The 
Eye of a Flie," enthused John Edwards, is "a more curious piece of Workmanship than 
the Sun it self." "The most despicable and disregarded pieces of decayed nature are so 
curiously wrought and adorned with such eminent signatures of Divine Wisdome," mar- 
veled Joseph Glanvill. According to Edward Tyson, the ephemeron, "if curiously examined 
... would excite our greatest Admiration, and force us to adore the Infinite Wisdom of 
the Maker." Minute creatures, in particular, had been compensated for their modest pro- 
portions by being adorned with the most lavish ornamentation: "they have Crowns, Hel- 
mets and other Curiosities on their Heads which outdo the most luxuriant Fancies of 
Men."51 And if the Deity had taken so much trouble to furnish his creation with curiosities, 
their study could hardly be a vice. 
By the early decades of the eighteenth century praise of curiosity was to become com- 
mon, and the ambivalence of the late seventeenth century begins to abate. In the 1711/12 
Boyle Lectures, William Derham reminded his listeners that Scripture commended not 
only God's works but also those "curious and ingenious Enquirers that Seek them out, or 
pry into them." The aim of the study of nature, according to Derham, was "to answer the 
Ends for which God bestowed so much Art, Wisdom and Power about them, as well as 
given us Senses to view and survey them, and an Understanding and Curiosity to search 
into them."52 Curiosity was thus a gift that God had intended us to gratify. Just as the Deity 
had seen fit to adorn his irrational creatures with curiosities, so had he equipped rational 
creatures with the curious inclination to investigate and enjoy them. 
By the middle of the century the rehabilitation of curiosity was all but complete, and 
there was general agreement that it was a virtue. David Hume, for example, who could 
hardly be said to share the priorities of the natural theologians, nonetheless defined curi- 
osity as "love of truth" or "love of knowledge." All knowledge, he insisted, arose out of 
curiosity, and indeed the suppression of this natural inclination could only result in reli- 
gious prejudice, "stupid ignorance," and "barbarism." As for curiosity and the Fall, Hume 
found implausible the notion that God would punish the human race for "slight curiosity 
and natural desire of life and knowledge." In short, if for Aristotle wonder was the begin- 
ning of knowledge, for Hume and his contemporaries that honor now fell to curiosity. This 
51 Boyle, Usefulnesse of Experimental Naturall Philosophy (cit. n. 46), p. 6; John Edwards, A Demonstration 
of the Existence and Providence of God (London, 1696), Pt. 1, p. 205 (Edwards is actually quoting Boyle); 
Joseph Glanvill, Scepsis Scientifica (London, 1665), p. 3; Edward Tyson, "To the Reader," in Swammerdam, 
Ephemera vita, trans. Tyson (cit. n. 47), sig. Av; and Malebranche, Search after Truth, cit. in Edwards, Dem- 
onstration, Pt. 1, p. 204 f. 
52 William Derham, Physico-Theology (London, 1713), p. 466. 
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was a remarkable reversal. As Daston and Park have observed in their history of wonder: 
The passions of wonder and curiosity had ... been traditionally remote from one another in 
medieval natural and moral philosophy, and they were to separate once again by the mid- 
eighteenth century. Moreover, during the same period that wonder and curiosity first approached 
and then withdrew from one another, the trajectories of their valorization in natural philosophy 
also crossed, with curiosity ascending and wonder declining. On the one hand, the wonder that 
had once been hailed as the philosophical passion par excellence was by 1750 the hallmark of 
the ignorant and barbarous. On the other hand, curiosity, for centuries reviled as a form of lust 
or pride, became the badge of the distinterested and dedicated naturalist. 
Such were the fortunes of this once-despised vice that in 1751 Samuel Johnson could 
articulate that view of curiosity now most familiar, confidently declaring it to be "one of 
the permanent and certain characteristics of a vigorous mind."53 
CONCLUSION 
The changing fortunes of curiosity in seventeenth-century England shed light on a number 
of important developments in early modern natural philosophy. First, the Genesis narra- 
tives of the Creation and the Fall are usually regarded as having had a significant positive 
impact on the development of natural philosophy during the seventeenth century. Adam's 
perfect knowledge of nature supposedly provided an eschatological vision that motivated 
scientific inquiry and inspired natural philosophers to re-establish our first father's domin- 
ion over the natural world.54 However, the traditional view that curiosity and the quest for 
forbidden knowledge had been implicated in the catastrophic events that led to the Fall of 
Adam and his race meant that this Genesis text was at best a mixed blessing for the would- 
be investigator of nature. Bacon devoted considerable energy to providing alternative read- 
ings of this master narrative in order to neutralize its negative implications for the prose- 
cution of knowledge of nature. 
Second, this history of curiosity highlights an important shift in the relation of knower 
and knowledge, in which the significance of the moral character of the agent of investi- 
gation becomes increasingly irrelevant. One of the reasons curiosity ceases to play any 
significant part in the status of knowledge is that over the course of the seventeenth century 
the acquisition of knowledge is gradually dissociated from the personal morality of the 
investigator. The first stage in the process is the shift of focus away from traditional 
theological virtues to civic or social virtues. The significance of the latter for Restoration 
natural philosophy has been admirably demonstrated by Steven Shapin. At the same time, 
civic virtues come to be allied with disciplines or sets of practices. Hence the titles of 
Descartes's methodological works-Rules for the Direction of the Mind and Discourse 
on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason. The legitimacy of a body of knowl- 
edge is now derived from the following of a strict set of procedures rather than from the 
53 David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, 2.3.10, 2 vols. (London: Dent, 1911), Vol. 1, p. 448; Hume, Essays 
Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), Pt. 1, essay 14, pp. 113, 
118; Hume, History of England (London, 1778), Vol. 3, Ch. 37, p. 431; Hume, The Natural History of Religion, 
in The Philosophical Works, ed. Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, 4 vols. (Aalen: Scientia, 1964), 
Vol. 4, p. 355 n 87; Daston and Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (cit. n. 2), p. 304; and Samuel Johnson, 
Rambler, 12 Mar. 1751, no. 103. For a recent account of Johnson's view of curiosity see Mayhew, "Nature and 
the Choice of Life in Rasselas" (cit. n. 38). 
54 See, e.g., Webster, Great Instauration (cit. n. 33), pp. 6-12. 
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personal piety of the investigator. This development is also apparent in Bacon's writings, 
despite his lingering interest in the Christian virtues. John Leary has thus observed that 
Bacon's instauration called for "men of science to submit to the regimen embodied in [his] 
methodological and organisational prescriptions." Stephen Gaukroger has likewise sug- 
gested that Bacon's account of method can be seen "either as elaborating stringent pro- 
cedures that individual scientists should follow, or as setting out the rules governing a new 
elite community subject to stringent measures designed to organise the investigation of 
nature at a social level."55 For a time these methodological prescriptions coexisted with a 
set of moral requirements, and together they determined the legitimacy of knowledge 
claims. As the Christian and civic virtues gradually faded from view, however, appeals to 
prescribed methods came eventually to be regarded as the sole criteria for judging knowl- 
edge claims in the scientific realm. The importance of this development can hardly be 
overstated, for it is a precondition for the common claim that the distinguishing feature of 
scientific knowledge is its objectivity. 
Third, the changing connotations of "curiosity" are linked to the fate of another term 
that was of central importance in seventeenth-century debates about the status of natural 
philosophy-"usefulness." Increasingly from the end of the seventeenth century we en- 
counter justifications of knowledge in terms of its practical, as opposed to religious or 
moral, usefulness. This, too, is indicative of a severing of the connection between the 
moral qualities of the investigator and the legitimacy of the knowledge obtained. For as 
long as the usefulness of natural philosophy lay in its moral and religious applications, the 
personal virtues of the investigator could reasonably be considered evidence for the legit- 
imacy of the knowledge. Once again, this reframing of the notion of usefulness is indicative 
of the tendency to exclude moral elements from the methods of natural philosophy. 
There remains the question of the extent to which the debates that took place in early 
modem England might be said to be typical of Continental Europe as well. My original 
concern had been to understand the complex background of ideas on curiosity against 
which Bacon set forth his proposed instauration of knowledge and to see how curiosity 
subsequently fared in seventeenth-century England. But in carrying out this project I hope 
also to have shown that there are clear indications in the writings of Descartes, Male- 
branche, and other Continental thinkers that they grappled with similar concerns. Indeed, 
given the patristic and medieval treatments of curiosity, it could hardly have been other- 
wise. Specific treatments of curiosity in other traditions of natural philosophy, and con- 
siderations of how they compare to the English situation, however, await another study. 
Of more immediate importance, perhaps, is Lorraine Daston's suggestion, similarly 
prompted by a study of "the curious sensibility" in the early modem period, that "a history 
of sensibilities might deepen the history of science."56 The gradual transformation of cu- 
riosity from vice to virtue is an integral part of a larger story in which moral sensibilities 
delimit the sphere of legitimate knowledge and determine which natural objects are worthy 
of serious attention. While it might be possible to discern in the activities of early modern 
55 John Leary, Francis Bacon and the Politics of Science (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1994), p. 218; and 
Gaukroger, ed., Soft Underbelly of Reason (cit. n. 35), p. 5 f. 56 Daston, "Curiosity in Early Modem Science" (cit. n. 6), p. 403. The task of exploring treatments of curiosity 
in other traditions of natural philosophy has been commenced in Neil Kenny's Curiosity in Early Modem Europe: 
Word Histories (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), which considers the topic of curiosity in dissertations from 
German universities, and in Hans Blumenberg's The Legitimacy of the Modem Age (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1983). 
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natural philosophers something that appears to answer to a "scientific method," it would 
be a mistake to conclude that the historical actors themselves regarded the legitimacy of 
their enterprise as dependent solely upon that method. It is for this reason, amongst others, 
that what they were engaged in was a morally informed "natural philosophy" and not a 
putatively objective "science." 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.19 on Mon, 02 Nov 2015 06:18:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
